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by Alena Ledeneva
Informality is the key to how politics, the economy and society
function in Russia. If we want to understand how power works,
we have to delve behind the Kremlin’s formal facade and take into
account informal networks, clientelism, kickbacks, complex rules
and subtle signals. The term sistema (the system) refers to opaque
ways in which informal networks interact with formal hierarchies.
Sistema cannot simply be ‘reformed’ in the traditional sense of
the word. First, sistema is one of Russia’s open secrets. Most
Russians, and especially the elites, know what it is and how it
works, but they would rather not spell it out. If they talked about
it openly, the system’s absurdity would become apparent. But the
elites do not want to challenge sistema since this could get them
expelled from their formal positions, from informal networks, or
even from the country. Yet as long as Russia’s elites do not
challenge how the country is governed, meaningful change is
impossible. Second, while sistema is in many ways absurd,
detrimental for long-term development and probably ultimately
self-destructive, it is also the glue that keeps Russia’s economy
and society together. If sistema unravelled, the consequences
would be hard to manage. 
Modernisation in Russia cannot succeed as long as this system of
informal power and governance remains untouched. Russian leaders
talk about changing Russia from the top down, without however
addressing the informal rules and constraints that govern their own
behaviour and that of political, bureaucratic and business elites. 
Informal power and its instruments
Instruments of informal governance are not new, nor do they
only exist in Russia.8 For example, a recent
study of Britain’s formal and informal cabinet
machinery throws light on how the British
government really works.9 An older study
warns of the potential dangers of informal
governance inside the European Union.10 Not
all informal links amount to informal
governance, however. For example, Prime
Minister David Cameron’s links to the
scandal-ridden Murdoch press bear little
resemblance to the systematic links between
political leaders and the media in Russia. The
existence of informal practices in a society
does not mean that there is a hidden system.
It is only when such patterns of behaviour are
repeatedly or predictably used that they
transform into a system. 
In Russia over the centuries, informal rules and practices have often
been at least as important to understanding the workings of power
and commerce as formal constitutions and laws. Tsarist Russia had
its own sistema and so did the Soviet Union. A different sistema has
evolved during the rule of Vladimir Putin. 
Putin’s sistema
On the surface, Putin’s Russia is governed through a ‘vertical of
power’, a hierarchy in which decisions are passed from the top
down, from the centre to the regions, and from the government
through the economy. But Putin’s sistema also contains networks,
controls and constraints that undermine this vertical and skew its
policies. Sistema consists of the mix of formal governance (which is
the result of ofﬁcial hierarchies and policies) and informal networks
and inﬂuences. 
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Some observers have described Putin’s governance model as neo-
Soviet, because of its reliance on strong leadership, economic
control, superpower ambitions and confrontational foreign policy.
It has also been said to reproduce the ‘stability of cadres’ (an
enduring and closed ruling elite) once associated with Brezhnev’s
period of late socialism. Top ofﬁcials and insiders are shufﬂed
around, but few ever get sacked or seriously demoted. Putin does
not betray his own people – unless they break informal agreements
and go against sistema. 
Putin’s sistema has some elements of the ‘administrative-command’
style of governance of late socialism (these were: state property,
central planning, bureaucratisation, resource allocation on the basis
of ideology and the mobilisation of cadres, or elites, through a
deﬁned command structure). But there are also signiﬁcant
differences: the party line has given way to private interests, state
property to privatised assets, economic planning to the constraints
of global markets, an economy of favours to pyramids of kickbacks,
and command methods to instruments of informal governance. 
Because sistema is complex, subtle, and ambivalent, most Russians
ﬁnd it difﬁcult to spell out what they mean by it. When prominent
journalists such as Yulia Latynina and Andrei Loshak write about
Putin’s sistema, insiders smile at its paradoxes while outsiders are
shocked by its absurdity or simply doubt its existence. Let us
consider an example.
IKEA’s experience with sistema
Andrei Loshak uses the story of the Swedish furniture giant IKEA to
illustrate the corrupt and counter-productive nature of the system:
“[When it opened its ﬁrst branches], the company announced that
even in Russia it would be adhering to its clearly-formulated
Swedish rules, based on the Protestant work ethic [which mandated
that no bribes would be given]. As a result, ofﬁcials in Khimki [a
small town near Moscow] turned off the electricity just before
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IKEA’s ﬁrst Moscow store was to open. There was no practical
reason for this. They just wanted to ‘give them a hard time’ for their
excessively strict principles. By the time IKEA opened in St
Petersburg, the Swedes already knew that they
had to have their own generator in each of their
Russian stores – just in case. A wise decision, as
subsequently emerged.”11
The company has opened 230 stores all over the world, but was
unable to overcome what Loshak calls the ‘implacable cupidity’ of
the ofﬁcials in the Volga city of Samara: “The last complaint [of
the Samara ofﬁcials] was that the building was insufﬁciently
hurricane-proofed. The Swedes were unable to obtain any
information about destructive tornados wreaking havoc on the
left bank of the Volga and took umbrage. IKEA’s legendary
founder Ingvar Kamprad announced that investment in Russia
would be scaled down. But local ofﬁcials were unlikely to be
fazed by such triﬂes. Their actions are, after all, not dictated by
narrow personal interest. They are supporting the normal
functioning of an irrational system.” 
The question for foreign investors in Russia is whether it is possible
to work within the system without getting involved in
reprehensible practices. Loshak suggests that it is near impossible
to work honestly in a corrupt environment. In other words: foreign
investors cannot import their values if these contradict the values
embedded in sistema. 
IKEA had seen itself as a kind of Sir Lancelot intent on beheading
the dragon of Russian corruption. But since corruption is an integral
part of the system, the dragon immediately grows yet another head.
In IKEA’s case, a subsequent investigation revealed that the Russian
employee responsible for procuring the generators was receiving
kickbacks from the leasing company. These kickbacks considerably
increased the costs of IKEA’s corruption-avoidance strategy – while
also feeding the dragon. 
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Loshak found that the Russian judiciary appears to be operating in a
similarly absurd fashion: when IKEA tore up its agreement with the
corrupt leasing ﬁrm, a Russian court ﬁned it S5 million for breach of
contract. “We had come up against something way outside what we
usually encounter,” said an IKEA source. The Swedes, just like the
surveyor K in Kafka’s ‘The castle’, tried to use the powers of reason
to overcome the absurd – a fruitless attempt. 
Paradoxes and traps of sistema
Loshak distils the absurd logic of sistema in the
sentence “We were born to make Kafka come
true” and speaks of an ‘oxymoron culture’ in
which ideas such as ‘conservative modernisation’,
‘sovereign democracy’ and ‘Parliament is not the
place for discussions’ disorient and brainwash the
public. Latynina agrees, arguing that sistema
provides absurd incentives.12 Basic economic
principles are turned on their heads: good deeds
and value creation are punished while the extraction of kickbacks and
rent-seeking behaviour are rewarded. Sistema does not punish
wrongdoing; instead it defends its supporters and maximises the power
of ofﬁcials in charge of the distribution of funds. In this “through-the-
looking-glass” land, writes Latynina, the very term sistema, which
originally stood for a well-organised and co-ordinated structure, has
come to mean its opposite. Among Russia’s systemic paradoxes, Lilia
Shevtsova, an analyst at Carnegie Moscow identiﬁes “the failure of
success, the uncertainty of certainty, the instability
of stability and the impotence of omnipotence”.
She argues that the economy functions in a
dysfunctional way: the economic growth and
stability of Putin’s Russia is detrimental to the
country’s development in the long term.13
In my view, to describe the workings of sistema as absurd and
self-defeating is at best a partial truth. Even if it is hostile,
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anonymous, unpredictable and seemingly irrational, sistema also
serves to glue society together, to allocate resources and to
mobilise people; it contributes to both stability and change; and
it ensures its own reproduction. 
Russia’s present-day sistema encourages the Russian people to
work, but in an ambivalent, even paradoxical, way. Its system of
incentives prioritises short-term proﬁt at the expense of long-term
sustainability; loyalty at the expense of professionalism; safety and
collective responsibility at the expense of corporate leadership;
and innovative strategies to circumvent the constraints of sistema
at the expense of productive innovation. Russia’s self-made
businessmen often say that they have achieved their success despite
sistema, whereas businessmen that are sistema insiders tend to be
silent, or they deny that their success owes much to close links with
inﬂuential politicians.
The impact of informality is not exclusively negative. One cliché
about corruption in Russia is that the economy would not be able to
work without it: anti-corruption policies cannot be effective until
and unless Russia ﬁrst addresses the problems associated with
ineffective institutions, especially the judiciary. 
In the short run, tools of informal governance (see box) can help
leaders to pursue their policy objectives. Such tools help them to
exert control over the media, bureaucracy and judiciary as well as
parts of the economy. For example, companies in Russia know that
the political leadership expects them to show ‘corporate
responsibility’ through supporting political, social, youth,
environmental and charity programmes. The leadership also uses
informal leverage and networks to promote its modernisation
agenda. So companies feel compelled, if not privileged, to sign up to
Kremlin-sponsored projects such as the Skolkovo innovation city,
even if they do not believe in their viability. 
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In the long run, however, the informal tactics for mobilising elites
and allocating resources to insider networks undermine the
fundamental principles of the rule of law, the separation of powers
and the security of property rights. Ultimately, they reduce Russia’s
chances of achieving the strategic goals of modernisation. I call this
the ‘modernisation trap of informality’: one cannot use the potential
of informal networks without triggering their negative long-term
consequences. Informal networks enable Russia’s leaders to mobilise
people and resources for their modernisation projects. In the process,
they create vested interests and lock politicians, bureaucrats and
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Tools of informal governance
I distinguish four types of instruments of informal governance: informal
agendas, informal signals, informal afﬁliations and informal sanctions. Take
the example of Russian television. Employees of all major TV stations have
informal afﬁliations with the Kremlin. Control is exercised through informal
signals, or even directives, such as black lists of individuals who should not be
allowed to appear on TV, or white lists of people who should not be criticised.
Informal agendas are revealed when TV stations routinely omit certain subjects
or ignore certain individuals perceived as disloyal. For example, after Alexey
Kudrin resigned as ﬁnance minister in September 2011, his face never
appeared on Russia’s ofﬁcial broadcasters; and records of his angry exchanges
with President Medvedev were cut down to Kudrin’s retort that stepping down
would be his own decision.
Informal sanctions consist of diverting advertising away from disloyal TV
channels, or by hinting to private banks which media organisations should
have access to loans and which should not. Instruments of informal
governance tend to be subtle and do not violate the law as such. One cannot
pin down a bank or a private entrepreneur for not giving a loan or placing an
advertisement on this or that channel, for the formalities are duly preserved.
businessmen into informal bargains and pledges of loyalty that then
impede change and modernisation. 
The intricacies of informal governance are hard to monitor and
measure. Insiders often do not fully recognise these intricacies
themselves – or they have built up a capacity to deny to themselves
what they are doing. A recent survey of 500 top managers of a
large state-owned company in Russia illustrates this point. When
asked to assess their own leadership style in running their
departments, the majority of the managers described themselves as
either “visionary” or “democratic”. Yet 90 per cent of them said
that the day-to-day leadership style prevalent in their company was
“coercive”. This massive gap between people’s self-perception and
their assessment of the governance system they operate under
shows that sistema insiders somehow have to deal with its
paradoxes and double standards, be it through self-deception,
denial or cynicism. 
Moreover, sistema leaves its insiders compromised and vulnerable –
which makes it all the more difﬁcult for them to speak out against
the system. Widespread corruption, for example, helps to hold
sistema together. Those involved in corruption are compromised,
their property rights are insecure, and they are therefore bound into
the system. Those people who do not want to play by the rules of the
game face a choice: they can become passive members of society
without any prospects for advancement or
enrichment, or they can challenge sistema and
embark on the thorny path of dissidents.14
Exit and voice
When people fall out with sistema, they often, as outsiders, find
it easier to see its contours and speak out against it. But not
every criticism of sistema practices means that an insider
becomes an outsider. Take the examples of Mikhail Prokhorov
and Alexey Kudrin. 
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As Russia’s third-richest businessman and owner of the New Jersey
Nets, Prokhorov had been known more for his lavish lifestyle than
his political ambitions until, in June 2011, he became leader of the
‘Right Cause’ party. Right Cause has evolved out of a number of
small but unsuccessful liberal parties, and is now widely assumed to
be a ‘pocket opposition’ party used by the Kremlin to capture the
urban liberal vote.
In 2011, the Kremlin decided the party needed a more effective
leader and Prokhorov took over. However, after a brief and failed
attempt to add his own candidates to Right Cause’s list, Prokhorov
was expelled from the party in September 2011. 
Prokhorov’s story demonstrates the double standards inherent in
sistema. He did not mind playing by sistema’s informal political
rules that placed him in the position of party leader. When he was
expelled, however, he accused Vladislav Surkov, the Kremlin’s then
chief of political operations, of being a “puppet master” for having
engineered his dismissal and stiﬂing ‘real’
political opposition. Prokhorov seemingly
preferred a loud exit from sistema to
compliance with its rules on loyalty.15
It is also possible to express discontent within
the conﬁnes of sistema, as illustrated by
Kudrin’s departure after eleven years as
Russia’s ﬁnance minister. After Kudrin had
openly disagreed with President Medvedev over
budget spending, he was asked to resign. But
Kudrin used his resignation to show loyalty to
Putin so his options have remained open. 
The fact that some prominent ﬁgures are
willing to speak out against sistema could be an
indicator of change within the political elite. However, speaking out
is generally equated with going against sistema, which usually
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results in expulsion. Most members of the elite will be reluctant to
cut the branch they are sitting on, so they will continue to play by
sistema rules.
Reform needs to start above, not from above
By keeping sistema insiders compromised and under suspended
threat of punishment, Russian leaders can shape their decisions and
manage power networks. By resorting to informal tools of pressure
or blackmail, however, the leaders themselves become compromised,
which makes them less likely to question their own leadership style.
Russia’s current leadership is talking about reforming Russia ‘from
above’ by focusing on changing the behaviour of others (often using
informal tools). But it is unrealistic to expect them to reform the
‘above’ – themselves – ﬁrst, which would involve leaders reﬂecting
on the informal ways they use to get things done, admitting and
changing them. 
It is this self-reﬂection, the need for the elites to transform themselves
before they seek to change others, that is the key to Russian
modernisation. Previous modernisation attempts in Russia, including
the reforms of Peter the Great, liberalisation under Alexander II and
Gorbachev’s perestroika, failed to achieve their long-term objectives.
These leaders changed institutions mostly according to imported
templates. But they left untouched the informal governance
mechanisms, the inner workings of sistema. I argue that the reason
for that recurrent failure was that the leaders of these reform efforts
never became fully aware of the power networks and informal
instruments they used to advance their modernisation agendas. In this
sense, they acted blind-folded. They made what looked like profound
changes, but they could not make these changes sustainable because
the new formal institutions and rules did not correspond to the
underlying informal norms and customs. 
As soon as Peter the Great passed away, and with him his strong
personal control over new institutions and key actors, sistema made
26 Three views on modernisation and the rule of law in Russia
a full comeback. Russian bureaucrats – now residing in newly built,
European-looking St Petersburg, dressed in West European attire
and conversing in German and Dutch – returned to the more
comfortable practices of proﬁting from their government jobs,
promoting friends and relatives and diverting public funds toward
private projects (or private funds to public projects). 
It will take an enlightened leader (or group of leaders) – one who is
self-aware – to ﬁght sistema’s destructive forces while preserving its
capacity for innovation, and gradually to replace informal tools
with effective alternatives. Russia’s modernisation campaign cannot
reach its ambitious goals unless the consequences of informal
governance are spelled out. 
It is tempting to assume that there are obvious reform measures that
Russia could undertake to replace sistema with a market economy
and the rule of law. But sistema enables Russian society to cope with
its problems while at the same time undermining those reforms.
Unless Russia’s leaders address this fundamental paradox, there is no
obvious way of tackling sistema without weakening the social
cohesion that enables Russian society to function.
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